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In the SttpreJlte Cottrt of the
State of Utah

AMY ELIZABETH McKEE
OSTLER GREENER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

)
CASE
NO. 7265

vs.
THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER
and JAMES AITEN GREENER,
Defendants and Respondents.

\

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the judgment and Decree of
the Fourth District Court in favor of the defendant Thomas Richardson Greener, and against the plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed suit against the defendant Thomas Rich::trdson Greener for divorce, and for the reinstatement of
approximately $30,000 in funds that had been on deposit
in certain banking institutions in the joint names of the
plaintiff and the said defendant, but which funds had been
withdrawn by the said defendant. (R, 2-5)
Upon hearing on order to show cause (R, 9-10) it de- . ·
vel oped that the said defendant had removed said funds
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and transferred them to his son, James Aften Greener.
Thereupon an amended complaint was filed (R, 11-16) making James Aften Greener and the Helper State Bank also
parties defendant, and an order to show cause and temporary restraining order (R, 22-23) was issued and served
upon each of the defendants (R, 20, 21, 23). The court,
upon the hearing, dissolved the restraining order as to the
Helper State Bank (R, 31), and dismissed the order to show
cause (R, 32). Upon stipulation of the remaining parties
(R, 32), a second amended complaint (R, 33-42) was filed
against the defendants, Thomas Richardson Greener and
Jam~ Aften Greener, and eight banks and saving and loan
associations, all of whom were brought before the court on
orders to show cause (R, 46-49) in an effort to restrain the
latter from honoring checks which they had issued to the
defendant James Aften Greener representing the sums of
money that had theretofore stood in the joint accounts of
the plaintiff and the defendant Thomas Richardson Greener, but had been transferred by him to the defendant James
Aften Greener. The second amended complaint and restraining orders and all of the orders to show cause were
dismissed as to all of the defendants except Thomas Richardson Greener and James Aften Greener (R, 131). An
order of the court was subsequently made re11easing thq
sum of $1,608.00 on deposit in the Springville Bank to the
account of James Aften Greener, to Elmer L. Terry, one
of counsel for the defendants, as trustee, for certain uses
(R, 145-146). The balance of the sums withdrawn by
James Aften Greener by means of checks as aforesaid was
deposited under order of the court in time accounts in four
separate banks in Utah County (R, 154). These accounts,
approximating a total of $18,271.08 (R, 114) at the time of
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deposit, have been reduced by the sums of $86.80, representing costs of transcript of proceedings in the District
Court, and $250.00 attorneys' fees to plaintiff's counsel,
to apply toward fees on appeal under order of the court
(R, 165-166).
In Plaintiff's second amended complaint she sues defendant Thomas Richardson Greener for divorce on the
grounds of cruelty, for alimony, court costs and attorneys'
fees. She also claims a one-half interest in the funds transferred by Thomas Richardson Greener to James Aften
Greener, and alleges that the transfer was fraudulent as
to her, both as to her one-half interest and· to the balance
of the fimd as well. She seeks to set aside said transfer
of funds, and to have herself declared the absolute owner
of one-half of said ftmds and of such further amount thereof as she may be entitled to by reason of her marital rights
therein (R, 33-42).
An answer, apparently on behalf of both defendants,
Thomas Richardson Greener and James Aften Greener,
and a cross complaint on l?ehalf of the former w~re .filed
(R, 105-108). Plaintiff filed her reply to the cross complaint and counterclaim (R, 109-110).
After hearing, the court issued its memorandum of
dfcision (R. 115-124), made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R, 147-151) and entered its Decree on August 26, 1948, denying the plaintiff a divorce, and holding
that the funds in question are the sole funds of the defendant Thomas Richardson Greener, and are being held in
trust by the defendant James Aften Greener for the .use
and benefit of the said Thomas Richardson Greener,· and
ordering the release of the funds to the said James Aften
Greener (R, 152). On August 27, 1948, the order here-
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tofore mentioned regarding the deposit of the funds with
the various banks in Utah -County was issued (R, 154).
Notice of appeal (R, 161) was served on defendants'
counsel on October 22, 1948, and with an affidavit of impecuniosity (R, 162) was filed by the plaintiff with the
court on the same date. No cross-appeal has been filed by
either of the defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The plaintiff herein, a woman of the age of 65 years
(Tr. 40) , prior to her marriage to the defendant, Thomas
Richardson Greener (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"Greener") on the 2nd day of October, 1946 (Tr. 10) was
a widow living at Springville, Utah. She had been married once before, but her first husband had died some ten
years before her marriage to Greener (Tr. 42-43). Prior
to her marriage to Greener she had a home in Springville
and was drawing an old age pension (Tr. 47-48).
Some time prior to his marriage to the plaintiff the
defendant Greener (who will be 81 years old on January
13, 1949 (Tr. 112) approached one Agnes Rowland a sister-in-law of the plaintiff, inquired of her what kind of a
woman the plaintiff was, and asked her if she thought the
plaintiff would get married; that he was lonesome and wanted someone to keep house for him. Mrs. Rowland indicated that, "as far as her getting married, I don't know anything about that, but . . . as far as I know she is a
good woman." Greener then asked Mrs. Rowland to see
and talk to the plaintiff and to ask her how she felt about
it. He then volunteered to Mrs. Rowland that, "Some people think I have got forty thousand dollars, but I haven't
got that much. But I have got enough to keep her for the
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rest of her days. And one thing she will never have to go
on the old age pension." The next morning he returned
and said, "1\irs. Rowland, you can make that as big as you
want, and I will make it good." (Tr. 5-6). This information was conveyed by Mrs. Rowland to the plaintiff, who
informed her to tell Greener "to do his own courting" (Tr.
6, 12).
This information having been relayed back to Greener,
he called on the plaintiff and asked her if she wanted to
get married, telling her that he was lonesome and needed
someone with him and wanted to know if she would marry
- him. She told him that she would have to think it over.
In the course of their conversation, among other things,
he told her that he had thirty thousand dollars in money,
t~vo thousand dollars in bonds, five hundred dollars which
a son owed him, and five hundred dollars that two grandsons owed him. He told her that she "could have all that
and everything he had, and the old man thrown in with it
if [she] would have him" (Tr. 13.) He visited her daily after that (Tr. 9), and repeated his pron1ises "all over again
if [she] would have him" (Tr. 14). About two weeks after
the first visit they decided to marry, and Greener made
the promises again and told her that they would go to Salt
Lake and Provo to banks in which his money was deposited
and have her name entered on the accounts, so that she
would be just as much owner of the money as he was. Aft. er the marriage they went together to the banks and savings and loan companies, where they signed joint account
.~greements at each institution. (Tr. 15-16, Stip. of Fact,
R. 112-114, Exhibits A, B, C, D, and I). Passbooks were
then issued by the depositories in the names of Thomas R.
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Greener or Amy E. Greener. (Stip. of Fact, R, 112, Tr.
18, 201).
After their marriage plaintiff and Greener got along
well until they had a visit from one of the sons of the latter, who, during the course of the conversation between
the son, Greener and the plaintiff, said that he didn't see
why his father married the plaintiff, to step in and take
his mother's place and have the money. (Tr. 19). The son
also stated that he would see that the plaintiff didn't get
a penny of the money. Shortly thereafter, Greener asked
the plaintiff if she would get a divorce, saying that if she
would "maybe his children would come back to him and
treat him decent again." They conversed as to the amount
of money the plaintiff should have, and settled on the sum
of $2,000. They then went to the offices of Roylance and
Terry (Tr. 79) who represented Mrs. Greener in filing suit
for divorce. It was difficult for counsel to find grounds.
None was found for the defendant, and the action was thus
filed ·by the plaintiff here, alleging impotency of Greener,
and a decree was entered on December 19, 1946 (Tr. 23,
R, 148-149). Plaintiff received the sum of $2,000, and went
with the defendant to Salt Lake, where her name was withdrawn as joint tenant from all of the accounts in the depositories. (R, 113, 149). Plaintiff used the $2,000 in remodeling her own home, etc. (R, 149, Tr. 188-192).
Not long after the entry qf the decree (a week, or perhaps a little longer) Greener asked the plaintiff to return
to him. He visited her every day at her home, and renewed
his requests that she return to him, and promised her over
and over that if she would return she could have all the
money in the bank accounts, his home, everything he had
and the old man thrown in with it. He promised to go with
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her again and have the bank accounts reestablished in their
joint names. Plaintiff did not immediately accept. In the
meantime, she was offered a position at the County Infinnary at $110.00 per month, which Greener begged her
not to accept, offering to give her instead $150.00 per
month. Plaintiff refused the $150.00 per month, and thereafter Greener "kept coming and wanting me to go back to
him", and made the smne promises over again as to her
having the money and property and reinstating her as joint
owner of the accounts. (Tr. 23-25). Defendant also solicited the aid of various 1nembers of the plaintiff's family by
her former marriage to intercede with plaintiff in his behalf. (Tr. 66, 71, 73). He told plaintiff's daughter-in-law,
Leora B. Ostler, on one occasion that "he would make sure
she [plaintiff] didn't have to want for money"; that "he
would give her $150.00 and he would go further than that
if he had to." (Tr. 62). One day, in the presence of Mrs.
Ostler, while defendant was sitting in the front room of
plaintiff's home talking to the plaintiff, he said that "if
she [plaintiff] would come back to him he would give her
all his property and all his money and the old man throwed
in with it." (Tr. 63). Plaintiff finally agreed to return and
live with the defendant upon the condition that he fulfill
his promises made to her concerning his property and bank
accounts (Tr. 25), and she would not have gone back to
him at that time if he had not made the promises with respect to his property and the money on deposit in the banks
(Tr. 26).
On April 3, 1947, plaintiff and defendant appeared in
Court and requested that the Decree of Divorce be set aside
and the action dismissed. Such was the order of the Court,
and thereafter, on or about April 16, 1947, they went to
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Salt Lake City, to the various depositories, signed agreements, of which Exhibits "E', "F", "G", "H", and "I", respectively, are true copies, and the sums of money then on
deposit in the said depositories to the credit of Greener were
transferred to accounts in the names of "Thomas R. Greener or Amy E. Greener" (Stip. R. 113, 149, Tr. 26-29, 201)
and new passbooks in conformity therewith issued (Tr. 29,
32-33, 107). On this latter occasion, after signing the
agreements, the plaintiff, in the presence of Greener, verified at each depository the fact that she had then just as
much right to the money and to write out check against it
as Greener had (Tr. 28-32). It was Greener's understanding, and he knew that during the times he and Mrs. Greener
were on the joint accounts in the depositories both of them
could draw on the accounts, and that there was no limitation upon either of them doing so, and he never imposed
any limitations in that respect (Tr. 146). Greener intended
that Mrs. Greener should have the money during his lifetime, and should become, with him, part owner in the funds,
and this was his intention when they returned to Salt Lake
City after the divorce was set aside, and the agreements
as to the funds were signed (Tr. 158-159).
Soon after the reconciliation, difficulties again arose
between the plaintiff and Greener (R, 149, Tr. 33). Greener kept demanding the return of the $2,000 plaintiff had
taken on the divorce settlement, but she refused to return
it (Tr. 34). This caused frequent quarrels between them
(Tr. 37), and on several occasions Greener accused the
plaintiff of robbing him of $2,000 (Tr. 34, 145). One of
these occasions was at the hearing on the first order to
show cause, in open court on law and motion day, in the
presence of members of the Bar and others present in Court
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(Tr. 199). On one of the occasions of the quarrels over
the $2,000, Greener told the plaintiff he "might do something desperate," took the paring knife that was on the cupboard and drew the back of the blade across plaintiff's
throat and then, with a stabbing motion, hit her with the
handle part over the heart (Tr. 33-34). On this occasion,
plaintiff said to Greener, "Old man, you want to be damn
sure you make a good job of it." Greener threatened the
plaintiff many times, and said to her many times that he
might do something desperate (Tr. 80).
Although the plaintiff had never threatened to remove
any part of the funds on deposit in the joint accounts (Tr.
134, 203-204) , Greener had lain in the same bed with the
plaintiff at night unable to sleep "wondering how in the
devil I was going to get out of the net she had me in" (Tr.
119), and studying how to get the plaintiff's name off the
various bank accounts (Tr. 119, 138-139). He first determined to take her name off of the books " a few months
before I done the job"; and because he "couldn't get away
from her to do it,
. . didn't want her there when I
did it" and "didn't want her to know that I done it" he waited until she went to California in December, 1947, to do
the job (Tr. 139).
On this latter occasion, unknown to the plaintiff, and
without her consent (Tr. 40), Greener went to the various
depositories in which the joint accounts were located and
had the funds on deposit in the joint accounts transferred
to the sole account of his son, the defendant James Aften
Greener (Stip. R, 113-114, Tr. 135). Greener testified that
he gave the money to his son, James Aften Greener (Tr.
198) absolutely (Tr. 196-197, 215), and with no thought in
mind or any agreement that he could get any part of it
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back if ·he wanted (Tr. 140, 204). The defendant James
Aften Greener (hereinafter referred to as "Aften") testified at the show cause hearing of January 30, 1948, that
his father "transferred the money into my name and told
me he was giving me the money as a Christmas present"
(Tr. 214), that it was given to Aften as his own and that
nothing was said about returning it to the father (Tr. 214215).
After the transfer of the funds to Aften, the defendant Thomas Richardson Greener had no property other
than his home (Tr. 112, 124), and no means whatever to
support the plaintiff (Tr. 139-140, 205), and thereafter
Greener's ability to support the plaintiff would depend on
what his children, who were opposed to. his marriage to the
plaintiff (Tr. 22, 140, 205), would give him (Tr. 140)..
Upon the plaintiff's return from California, as a result
of the receipt by mail of a bank statement, some question
arose as to the bank accounts, and when the plaintiff asked.
Greener what he had done with them he told her it was
none of her business (Tr. 35, 176) , that she was crazy that
she didn't write out some checks and get some of the money (Tr. 35), and that if she wanted to know what he had
done with the money to go and talk to his sons, George and
Ken. He also told the plaintiff after further talking that
she could stay at his home with him and he would feed her,
and that's all she would get, or she could get out of it, it
didn;t make a bit of difference to him. She chose to leave,
and left with no means of support, and with only five dol-lars that she had returned with from California (Tr. 36,
177).
Some time after plaintiff's return from California, her
grandson, Walter Mories, rode from Springville to Provo
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on the same bus with Greener and conversed with him.
During the conversation, Greener was telling Mories about
himself and his grandmother, said he felt pretty bad about
it, and that "there would be three .less people in the world
if he hadn't read the Bible on the consequences of murder
and suicide"* (Tr. 59-60).
This conversation was later related to the plaintiff by
the grandson after plaintiff filed this suit. She thereupon
consulted her counsel and asked him if she should have
Greener put under bonds for threatening her (Tr. 84). The
effect of the knowledge of the conversation frightened the
plaintiff, because Greener had told her many times before
that he would do something desperate. It made her nervous and so sick that she had to go to the doctor (Tr. 85).
The effect of all of the above acts of the defendant
Thomas Richardson Greener has been to make the plaintiff
extremely nervous and unhappy, to have trouble sleeping
(Tr. 38-39), to get up in the night and walk around, and to
cry and to have severe headaches and a poor appetite (Tr.
68-70).
The amount of money withdrawn from the Salt Lake
City depositories by James Aften Greener was $18,271.04
(R, 114). The amount on deposit in the Springville bank in
the joint account before the ·funds were transferred to Aften was $1,608.23 (Exhibit 0) or a total sum of $19,879.27.

*We believe the fair inference from this statetpen.t to
be the killing of Mrs. Greener and her sister Sarah (whom
the testimony reflects Greener dislikes very much) and his
own suicide.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I

The court erred in holding that plaintiff is not entitled
to a decree of divorce from defendant Thomas Richardson
Greener.
II
The court erred in failing to hold that plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce from defendant Thomas Richardson Greener.
III
The court erred in holding that the defendant is willing to resume marital relations.

IV
The court erred in entering its decree in favor of the
defeiJ.dants and against the plaintiff in that the pleadings
do not support the judgment.

v
The court erred in that its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree are not supported by the evidence.
VI
The court erred in holding thaCthe defendant was and
. is the sole owner of the funds referred to as on deposit in
various depositories on and prior to December 22, 1947,
and his. withdrawi_ng them was not fraudulent and constituted no cruelty against the plaintiff.

VII
The court erred in failing to hold that the transfers
· of funds in the joint accounts of the plaintiff and defendant
Thomas Richardson Greener to James Aften Greener on
or about December 22, 1947, were fraudulent as to the
plaintiff, and void.
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VIII
The court erred in holding that defendant James Aften Greener holds said funds in trust for the use and benefit of Thomas Richardson Greener during his natural life·
time, and that the defendants are entitled to have said funds
released from the custody of the court.
IX
The court erred in holding that no pre-marital agreement was entered into between plaintiff and defendant
Thomas Richardson Greener, in form as required by law
(33-5-4 Subsection 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943).
X
The court erred in failing to hold that plaintiff and
Greener entered into an oral agreement in consideration
of the setting aside of the decree of divorce, which agreement was further consummated by the signing of certain
written agreements, whereby the plaintiff became the owner as joint tenant with Greener on and after about April
16, 1947, of funds, theretofore on deposit with certain depositories, to the sole and separate account of Greener.
XI

The court erred in holding that defendant Thomas
Richardson Greener is the sole owner of the funds now in
the custody of the court.
XII
The court erred in failing to decree and set apart as
the sole and separate property of the plaintiff, one-half of
the total fund of $19,879.31 which was on deposit in the
joint accounts of the plaintiff and Greener on and prior to
December 22, 1947.
XIII
The court erred in holding that the sole purpose and
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intention of the plaintiff and Greener in placing the plaintiff's name. on the various agreements and bank books of
the depositories was to avoid probate, and neither of them
at any time, considered that the plaintiff owned any present interest in said funds.
XIV
The court erred in failing to impress a trust on that
portion of the funds remaining after deduction of plaintiff's
one~half interest,, for her support and maintenance, as well
as fqr her right of survivorship.
XV
The court erred in holding that plaintiff is not entitled
to attorneys' fees· or costs, and that the plaintiff should
bear her own expenses.

ARGUMENT
I

.. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT E.NTITLED TO A DECREE OF DIVORCE
FROM DEFENDANT THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER.
Seeking a divorce on the ground of cruelty (together
with other relief hereinafter discussed) plaintiff has alleged
in her second amended complaint in support of this cause
. of action specific acts upon the part of Greener as follows:
, 1.. The fraudulent conveyance of all his property (as
well as that of plaintiff), except whatever interest he may
have in his _home, and.the stripping of himself of all means
of supporting the plaintiff.
2. Accusing the plaintiff on many occasions of robbing him .of $2,000.
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3. Constant quarreling with the plaintiff ·over the return of the $2,000.
4. Threats by Greener that he "might do something
desperate."
5. The knife episode.
6. Telling the plaintiff that she could stay with him
and he would feed her and that was all she would get or
she could get out, it made no difference to him.
The Court found that "the defendant at no time during said marriage, held the plaintiff up to ridicule or shame,
nor did he at any time do any act or fail to do any act
which he should have done, which could have caused the
plaintiff mental anguish or bodily suffering, and at no time
during said marriage between plaintiff and defendant did
the defendant wield a knife or make any threats toward
the plaintiff, nor did the defendant commit any other acts
or violence during said marriage."
The Court also found that the withdrawing by Greener
of the funds on deposit in the various depositories was not
fraudulent and constituted no cruelty against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff takes issue with these findings on the
ground that there is no substantial evidence in the record
to sustain them, but, on the contrary, the plaintiff has
proved, by substantial testimony that cannot be impeached
by the record, that she is entitled to a divorce on any or all
of the grounds set forth above.
Before discussing these grounds, however, we desire
to point out that the only witnesses appearing on behalf of
the defendants were one Owen Harris Beardall (Tr. 94-98),
and Thomas Richardson Greener, the principal defendant;
James After Greener, the other defendant, did not appear
as a witness and testify at the trial on the merits.
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At the outset, and also before discussing the grounds
for divorce, we point out to the Court that there are many
grave and serious contradictions in Greener's testimony;
that if they do not in effect amount to perjury, at least they
show an utter disregard on Greener's part for his oath,
whether it be on the witness stand or in the privacy of his
own lawyer's office when solemnly swearing to his answer
and counterclaim in this suit.
In subsection (B) of this section of the brief we point
out the contradictions in Greener's testimony as to his accusations of plaintiff's robbing him.
On the hearing on the first order to show cause, which
. hearing was, of course, concerned in finding out the nature
. and extent of Greener's property and his ability to provide
. the plaintiff with temporary alimony and suit money, he
testified on direct examination that he had no stocks or
bonds from which he got any·money; that after the transfer of the funds on deposit to his son Aften, he had no money of his own but "a few coppers in my purse" (Tr. 196);
and that he expected to live during the next few months
and the remainder of his life on his friends and relatives
(Tr. 197). On cross examination Greener testified as follows (Tr. 202):
.4'Q.

Now, you did have some stocks and bonds, didn't

you?
A.

Government bonds, yes.
Q. You still have them, don't you?
A. I cashed them.
Q. When did you cash them?
A. Well, I cashed two of them the day we got out of
the Farmers and Merchants Bank.
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Q. But since that time you have had government
bonds, since you went back together again?
A. Yes.
Q. And you still have them, haven't you?
A. I cashed them, turned them in.
Q. What did you do with the cash?
A. Gave it to where it belongs.
Q. How is that?
A. I gave it to where the rest of it went, gave it to
my son."

And again (Tr. 205):
And you want the court now to believe you gave
away everything you had at that time and now that you
have nothing whatever to support yourself?
A. Yes sir."
"Q.

It is hard to conceive of any clearer or stronger statement Greener could have made to the effect that he had
then stripped himself clean, except for the few coppers in
his purse, and that he then had no bonds or other property
of any kind whatever (except his interest in his home) with
which to support himself.

But, it develops four months later, that Greener did
have some government bonds at the time of the previous
hearing because he testified at the trial of this cause as
follows· (Tr. 124-125):
You have absolutely no property or any~ money
at the present time?
A. None whatever.
Q. For how long has it been since you have been in
that position?
"Q.
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A. Since I cashed my last government bonds to pay
the money that went to her.
Q. All right, when was that?
A. Well, it is within the last month now.
Q. All right. Now, were those government bonds
cashed subsequent to the time you were here and testified
to the Court?
A. .Most of them.
Q. How many government bonds did you have at the
time you· testified here at the previous hearing?
A. About four.
Q. And what was the face amount of those bonds?
A. They was two of them was 50's, one was a $100,
and the other was $25, as I remember.
Q. But you did have those bonds and that property
at the time you testified here in this Court on the previous
occasion, is that right?
A. Yes."

And (Tr. 126-127):
Now, what did you mean when you answered 'Well
I have got a few coppers in my purse'? Did you mean that
was all the money you had or property?
A. That was all I had, was just a little bit what I had
in my purse except those four bonds that was left over that
I hadn't cashed.
Q. But at that time you didn't tell the Court you had
those four bonds; you told the Court in effect you didn't
have any other property or money except a few coppers
in your purse, isn't that right?
A. Yes, sir, that's right.
"Q.
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But you did have these bonds?
A. Those bonds.
Q. And those bonds are the source of the money by
which you have paid Mrs. Greener; is that right?
A. Yes, they are are all gone now.
Q. Now at the time you gave this money away to
Afton, that was on the 22nd of December, wasn't it, of last
year?
A. I can't remember just what date.
Q. \Vhat property did you have at that time?
A. \Vhy, I had the deed to my home and a few cents
in my purse and those four bonds that I had not cashed.
Q. And that is all you had?
A. That's all I had."
Q.

These statements are not merely inconsistencies in his
testimony or mere inadvertent misstatements, but direct,
un.equivocal and positive statements of a material fact that,
we submit, actually amount to perjury.
In Greener's cross complaint or counterclaim, which
is sworn to by him under oath, he alleges: "(c) That on numerous occasions during said marriage the plaintiff left
the home of plaintiff and defendant and stayed away for
long periods of time, and has refused to take care of said
home" (R, 107-108).
But on direct examination the following took place (Tr.
116-117):
During your marriage has the plaintiff ever left
your home and gone to her sister?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell the Court about that.
A. After she had came back to live with me, the sec"Q.
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ond time that she lived with me, her sister would come
there and stay there until evening, after dark. Then when
she would leave she would say, 'I am going part way with
her, part way home.' She was living in the house up on
the hill. And she said, 'I will be back in a little while.' She
done that repeatedly, several times. Shall I go on?
Q. Did she ever go away and stay away over days
at a time?
A. Oh, no."
In the cross complaint, Greener, after alleging the
above and other facts, alleged that such acts "have rendered the marriage relation intolerable and no longer endurable, and that unless a divorce is granted cross complainant's health will be greatly impaired by reason of plaintiff's actions as above set out (R, 108).
Counsel proceeded to ask Greener about the acts of the
plaintiff, got his answers and then to finish his proof in
support of Greener's prayer for divorce, asked Greener to
tell in his own words how the remarks, words and actions
of the plaintiff affected him (Tr. 118-119). His answer
was (Tr. 119):
"A. I couldn't sleep. I will state a little further, when
I slept with her, in the same bed, I had laid all night wondering how in the devil I was going to get out of the net
she had me in. And I couldn't eat, I couldn't sleep, and it
pretty near killed me. The neighbors could see it on me.
Q. Made you nervous?
A. Made me nervous. Made me so I wasn't myself."
Everything was all covered; counsel had submitted the
proof except for the property question (Tr. 119). Then on
cross examination Greener dropped a bomb shell. He sta-
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ted that he didn't want a divorce, never wanted one, had
never asked for one, was not asking for one now, and he
even went so far as to deny that he ever "signed any paper
at all" in which he "asked for a decree of divorce" (Tr. 146149). Counsel was embarrassed-he requested leave of the
Court to ask some leading questions, and was granted leave,
over plaintiff's objections, to do so. He then very carefully l2d Greener back over the circumstances of his reading, signing, and swearing to the cross complaint and to all
of counsel's questions except one Greener readily answered
"Yes." His only one other answer was, "I think so" (Tr.
150-154). The situation had been cleared, the cross complaint had been signed under proper circumstances-Greener had read it, and knew and understood what it contained.
But-Greener refused to stay put. On recross examination, to the same questions practically, in substance, Greener now answered '~No." However, he did admit very definitely that he read and signed the pleading (Tr. 154) and
then again proceeded to say that the pleading was truebut again upon being asked about the specific allegation
concerning the plaintiff's leaving his home and staying
away for long periods of time, he stated that he didn't recall reading such in the pleading, but if it were in it, the
fact was not true (Tr. 155).
Either counsel, in attaching his signature and seal of
his office to the answer and cross complaint, is subject to
censure, or Greener had so little regard for his oath that
we believe he has also in this instance committed perjury.
We give counsel the benefit of the doubt.
Even if this instance did not actually amount to per·
jury, is the testimony of one who vascillates from one extreme to the other, depending on who' is examining him,
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entitled to credence? Is this the kind of testimony upon
which a litigant can prevail in a suit in a court of equity?
If so, it certainly places a premium on false testimony, to
say the least.
The very gist of the court's opinion is that the conveyance of the funds by Greener to Aften was not fraudulent; yet how does the court justify the imposition of a
trust on the funds if he did not disbelieve the testimony of
Greener as to the bona fides of the conveyance? He could
have arrived at this result in no other way. At least in this
instance the Court did not and could not have believed the
testimony of Greener.
We proceed now to a discussion of the points which we
claim entitled plaintiff to a divorce.
A.

The fraudulent conveyance.

The record herein shows that as of December 22, 1947,
there was on deposit in the joint accounts of "Thomas R.
or Amy E. Greener" in various depositories a total sum of
$19,879.27. In addition to this, Greener owned certain government bonds and a home* in Springville (R, 148). Greener's testimony concerning the time of the disposition of the
bonds is conflicting (Tr. 194, 196, 202, 125, 127). However, he makes it clear on the hearing on the merits that
at that time he had no property other than the home•,
and had no source of income (Tr. 112, 124, 128), and that
his ability to support the plaintiff depended on what his

*This home stands in the name of Thomas E. Greener
and Lucinda J. Greener, his former wife, who is now deceased, as tenants in common (Def. Exhibit 1).
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children, who were opposed to his marriage to plaintiff,
would give him (Tr. 139, 140).
Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff was not a joint
tf'nant with Greener of the funds in the depositories, but
that the funds were in his own name and his separate property and that plaintiff's only rights therein were what the
law entitled her to as his wife, the transfer of the funds by
Greener to his son Aften, whereby the former stripped himself of all means by which to support and maintain the
plaintiff, constituted a fraud against the plaintiff. In such
circumstances the wife is considered to occupy a position
analogous to that of a creditor whose debtor has conveyed
property in fraud of the creditor.
In Trader v. Trader, (Idaho 1930) 285 P. 678, a suit
for divorce and to set aside a conveyance made by the husband, the court said (p. 679):
"Her husband had a right to convey his separate
property without her knowledge or consent, unless
said conveyance was with the design to defraud plaintiff of a right growing out of the marital relationship."
In Murray v. 1\Iurray, (Cal. 1896) 47 P. 37, where a
wife sued for maintenance and to set aside certain transfers
of property by the husband as fraudulent, the court said
(p. 39):
"Every ·transfer of property made with intent. to
delay or defraud any creditor or other person of his demands is by the statute of Elizabeth, reenacted in Civ.
Code, Sec. 3439*, declared void as against all creditors
*This section is similar to Sec. 33-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 24
of the debtor, etc. ·The wife, though not in strictness
a creditor of the husband, is yet, as concerns her right
to maintenance, so far within the protection of this statute that it avoids his transfers made with the design
to defeat such right. Green v. Adams, 59 Vt. 609, 10
Atl. 742; Tyler v. Tyler, 126 Ill. 525, 537, 21 N. E. 616
and cases cited; Stuart v. Stuart, 123 Mass. 370; ....
As shown, the plaintiff here has a demand enforceable
in equity, and it may be charged specifically upon the
property described in the complaint. Robinson v. Robinson, 79 Cal. 511, 21 P. 1095; . . . Plumb v. Bateman, 2 App. Cas. D. C. 170, 171; Ha.nscomb v. Hanscomb (Colo. App.) 39 P. 885."
To like effect is Petty v. Petty (Idaho 1946) 168 P. 2d
818, involving a conveyance by father held to be in fraud
of minor's right to support.
This doctrine is also applicable to cases where transfers of property have been made by the husband in order
to defeat the wife's right of inheritance. In LeStrange v.
LeStrange (1934) 242 App. Div. 74, 273 N. Y. S. 21, the
court cancelled, on the ground of fraud, a trust agreement,
conveyances and transfers by which a prospective husband,
the day after the issuance of the marriage license, had
transferred his property to himself as trustee, whereby he
was to pay the income to him~elf and after his death the
fund to be distributed to his three sons by a former marriage. It was held that a man cannot deliberately, by his
own purpose or through the inducement of other persons,
strip himself of all inheritable property in fraud of his prospective wife, to whom he has represented that he has sufficient property for their comfortable support and main-
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tenance, in which she will be entitled to share upon. his decease.
In Payne v. Tatem (1930) 236 Ky. 306, 33 S. W. (2d)
2, (in which a judgment setting aside a $4,000 gift by the
deceased husband of plaintiff to a daughter by a former
marriage was affirmed), the court stated that in view of
the fact that the decedent had only $4,660 at the time of
the gift, there was no escape from the conclusion that the
burden was on the daughter to overcome the presumption
of fraud, although the donor had been unusually devoted
to her; had taken a large number of meals at her home,
and he and his wife had visited her frequently.
A conveyance in fraud of the marital rights of the wife
of an heir was held to be shown in Blodgett v. Blodgett
(1932) 266 TIL App. 517, where such heir had received in
a partition proceeding a smaller share of the estate than
he would otherwise have been entitled to receive, by means
of a scheme, previously entered into with another heir, that
judgment should be confessed against the former on a fictitious note purporting to have been made by him to the
decedent.
An owner of property, in order to defeat the inchoate
rights of his wife under the Decedent Estate Law, which
in place of dower gives a widow certain rights in the property of which her husband dies seized, may not make such
a transfer as will enable him to keep control of his property and yet purposely prevent the property rights of his
wife from maturing at his death. Bodner v. Feit (1936)
247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. S. 814.
Numerous other authorities to this same effect might
be cited, but would unduly prolong this brief.
In the light of these authorities, there can be no ques-
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tion that the transfer of the funds on December 22, 1947,
by Greener to Aften was a fraud upon this plaintiff.
Did the act amount to cruelty? We think it did.
Here we have the picture of a scheming husband, who,
by his own testimony, lay in bed with his wife at night,
unable to sleep, "wondering how in the devil I was going
to get out of that net she had me in", and studying how to
get her name off of their joint bank accounts (Tr. 119,
138), and then, while she was on a visit to California, withdrawing all of their means of support and maintenance,
by removal of the funds on deposit and giving them to his
son Aften by a previous marriage, as a Christmas present,
leaving plaintiff thereafter subject to the charity and mercy
of Greener's family and friends, who were antagonistic to
her, for whatever charity they might deign to dole out to
her for support. This-in the face of the fact that there
had never been any threats by the plaintiff to remove any
of the funds or to do anything "except live up to the agreement with respect to the funds" (Tr. 134).
While we shall show later in this brief that Greener's
promises and agreements went further, he at least went
so far as to admit that he promised the plaintiff originally
that if she would marry him, and later, after the divorce,
if she would return to him, she would never have to want
(Tr. 106), and he guaranteed that she would never have
to go on old age pension (Tr. 102, 103). Yet, in spite of
these promises, he deliberately put himself in a situation
in which he would be unable to fulfill them.
At the time of the fraudulent transfer of the funds to
Aften, Greener was but a few days under 80 ·years. of age.
The plaintiff was 65. Her life expectancy was between 11
and 12 years, while Greener's was between 4% and 5%
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years. The probabilities are that plaintiff will outlive
Greener by several years. Is she to be pushed off on ·his
relatives for charitable. support and maintenance? If the
decision~ of the lower court is sustained, and the wishes of
Greener, as shown by his fraudulent design, are carried
out, that will be her lot.
We sub1nit that this act on the part of Greener, while
constituting a fraud upon the plaintiff, was also an extreme
act of cruelty, and- of itself justifies the granting of a divorce to plaintiff.
In its opinion the lower court found it necessary to
determine plaintiff's rights in the funds in order to ascertain whether Greener's transfer of them ·constituted· cruelty to plaintiff (R, 117). The court held Greener to be the
sole owner of the funds, and thus his withdrawing them,
whether surreptitiously or not, was not ·against any present
right of the plaintiff, and thus was not cruelty· (R. 121).
The court thus recognized, and the bur.den of the opinion is,
that if the transfer was fraudulent as to the plaintiff,. and
if she had any rights to the accounts and money~ therein,
then. the acts of Greener would amount to cruelty. The
court's opinion,. however, was -directed solely to the question whether the plaintiff was a present joint tenant of the
funds (which he held her not to be) , but he completely
overlooked the fact that we have above demonstrated, that
the transfer of the funds was fraudulent, even though she
was held to have no present ownership of the funds. We
think it to be inescapable that if the lower court had found
the transfer to have been fraudulent, it would have found
that the conduct of Greener in regard to the funds constituted cruelty.
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The record is clear that the acts of Greener with respect to these funds contributed to her physical and mental condition, as testified to by plaintiff, and is one of the
facts that makes it impossible for her to return to Greener
and make a go of married life (Tr. 38-39).
If, in addition to what we have assumed as a fact in
the foregoing argument, plaintiff owned a present undivided
one-half interest in the funds on deposit (which we hope
to demonstrate as a fact later in this brief)) then her position is much stronger.
B.

Accusing plaintiff of robbing him.

Plaintiff testified that on more than one occasion
Greener accused her of robbing him of two thousand dollars (Tr. 34). This is an accusation of crime which if false
constitutes cruelty, and of itself or in connection With other
causes may amount to cruelty. 19 C. J., p. 53.
Concerning this accusation, the lower court, in its opinion, states that "It could easily be found that the defendant
accused plaintiff of robbing him in connection with the
$2,000 settlement. There is nothing in the record, however, to show that he did so to anyone else but her,-that
he never held her up to ridicule or shame by it, or that it
caused her great mental anguish of bodily suffering."
We can well agree with the lower court that it could
easily be found that Greener accused the plaintiff of robbing him. What we cannot understand is how the court
could fail to make such a finding in the case, in view of the
record.
In the first place, the plaintiff testified to the fact categorically, and we believe that plaintiff's testimony is wor-
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thy of belief in every detail. While Greener has denied
certain of her testimony, including the fact that he ever
accused her of robbing him (Tr. 115), the record will not
bear with him in his denials. In fact, as we have hereinbefore shown, the record is replete with instances where
Greener has given conflicting testimony and made statements under oath that, if they do not amount to perjury,
show at least a careless disregard for his oath.
We invite the Court's attention to the very positive
denial of Greener as to the accusation of robbery upon his
direct examination (Tr. 115). In contrast to this, we set
forth certain testimony of Greener upon the first hearing
on order to show cause, as follows (Tr. 199):
Why did you withdraw that money from the
bank, Mr. Greener?
A. Because she robbed me of two thousand, and I
knew that she was after the other, and which she married
me. I could see all the way through that she married me
for money, not for T. R. Greener.
Q. Now, how did she rob you of two thousand dollars?
A. She had me on a pin hook, and I couldn't get
away."
"Q.

This statement was volunteered so readily by Greener
in open court, in the presence of persons who were in the
court room on a regular law and motion day, that it is hard
to understand how the lower court could ever have concluded that there is nothing in the record to show that
Greener made the accusation to anyone else but plaintiff.
Pursuing this matter a little further, after Greener
on direct examination very emphatically and positively de-
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nied having ever made the accusation, plaintiff's counsel
confronted Greener. with his previous testimony, and when
asked whether he made such a statement on the previous
hearing, he answered, "I don't remember saying that." (Tr.
128-129).- However, at a later point in his testimony, when
he was again asked about having made the statement, his
answer was, "I guess I said it." (Tr. 145). We would urge
to the Court that this speaks volumes in support of plaintiff's testimony, and against defendant's.
And again, this is but another of the elements which
contributed toward making plaintiff awfully nervous (Tr.
38) ,· unable to sleep, and unhappy, etc. (Tr. 39, 68-69).
C. . Constant quarreling over return of $2,000.
Except to point out that the plaintiff .testified that
there were frequent quarrelings. over the two thousand dollars _(Tr. 37), we are content to rely upon what has been
set forth .in the next preceding subdivision as being proof
of the many quarrels, and the effect of such quarrels upon
the plaintiff. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Wolfe in Johnson v. Johnson, 107 U 147, 152 P. 2d 426,'429.
D.

Threats by Greener; E,

Knife .episode.

Growing out of the quarrels over · the two thousand
dollars, the· plaintiff testified Greener threatened her many
times, saying: that he might do something desperate. On
one such occasion Greener demonstrated what he had in
mind- -by these threats. He took a paring knife that was
on the cupboard, drew the back of the blade across plaintiff's -throat, and then with a stabbing motion hit her with
the handle part over her heart (Tr. 33-34, 80).
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Concerning the knife incident, the lower court said
that "If it were satisfactorily proven that the knife incident were true, it would undoubtedly be such an act of cruelty as to justify a divorce." Because there was no direct
corroboration of plaintiff's testimony in this regard, the vehemence of Greener's denial of the act, the fact that the
incident, if true, would be the only circumstance of violence
in the record, and the fact that plaintiff never told of the
incident to relatives and friends who accused Greener of it
and had either an express or implied admission, ·the court
could not believe that plaintiff established it by a preponderance of the evidence.
We agree with the lower court that the knife incident,
if true. would amount to cruelty justifying a divorce, but
we strenuously disagree with the court's reasoning in concluding that the incident had not been proved. Was this a
mere figment of the plaintiff's imagination? Certainly the
record discloses no instance where plaintiff's testimony
has been impeached, no instance where she lied or perjured
her testimony. Is it reasonable to believe that she lied in
this instance? Greener denied -the act, but is mere vehemence enough? Surely, if a person who has been so dramatically threatened must relate the episode to relatives
or friends, who must accuse the party of it, and secure
either an express or implied admission, before the threat
can be established as made, pity the person who appeals
to the law for protection against such a threat. He will be
so busy running around to first this person and that person, telling them of the incident and having them go to the
one making the threat to get either an express or implied
admission, that he would in many instances become a victim of the threat long before he could possibly obtain the
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protection of the law. If this be the test to be applied in
proving that a threat was made, then we venture to say
that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred a threat cannot
be proved, because we doubt that in one out of a hundred
cases of threat, has the person threatened been able to
prove by a third person an express or implied admission
of such a threat from the person making the same. Suppose the threat had been made and the plaintiff had run
around to her relatives and friends, told them of the threat,
and the relatives and friends had gone to Greener and accused him of it, but to each· one he had vehemently denied
making it. How, then, could it be proved? The court by
this rule has made the act impossible of proof. Reductio
ad absurdum.
There is absolutely nothing in the record justifying
the statement of the court that plaintiff "never repeated
it [the threat] to any of her relatives or friends, etc."
There is in the record another incident of at least an
implied threat by Greener, in the statement made to plaintiff's grandson that "there would be three less people in
the world if he [Greener] hadn't read the Bible on the consequences of murder and suicide" (Tr. 59-60). This incident was never denied by Greener, vehemently or otherwise.
Plaintiff understood the meaning of these threats. In
the one case she said, "Old man, you want to be damn gobd
and sure you make a good job of it" (Tr. 80), and this was
another of the elements which contributed to the physical
and mental condition of plaintiff, as above shown. In the
other case, she was put in such fear because ·of it and the
many threats Greener had previously made, that she was
made nervous and so sick that she had to go to the doctor
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and to appeal to counsel for protection, and to place Greener under bonds (Tr. 85).
F.

Telling plaintiff that she could stay or get out, etc.

The plaintiff testified that Greener told her during a
quarrel soon after she returned from California that she
could stay at his home with him and he would feed her,
and that's all she would get, or she could get out of it,
it didn't make a bit of difference to him. She chose to
leave.
The court found against the plaintiff in this regard
(R, 150).
We submit this matter on the lack of verity on the part
of Greener's testimony as elsewhere considered in this brief.
II

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A DECREE OF DIVORCE
FROM DEFENDANT THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER.
We rest our case under this heading on the argument
under section I of this brief.
III

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT IS WILLING TO RESUME MARITAL RELATIONS.
On cross examination Greener testified as follows (Tr.
147):
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"Q. "Do you think you and Mrs. Greener could go
back and live together happily?
A. We would have to do different than we done before if we did."
and again (Tr. 149-150):

"I say, if she were to come back to you would you be
able to get the money back from Afton and put it in the
bank?
A. I never said I wanted her back.
Q. Do you want her back.
A. I didn't say so.
Q. Well, do you?
A. She wouldn't come and I wouldn't have her if-Q. Do you want her back?
A. She wouldn't come.
Q. That is your answer to my question, is it?
A. She would have to promise me certain things, she
would have to make affidavit to certain things before I
would take her back."
The above, we submit, is anything but impressive testimony showing a willingness to resume marital relations.
It certainly holds forth little hope that a resumption would
be successful.
Mrs. Greener testified that she did not think there was
any possibility of her returning to Mr. Greener and making
a go of married life after what had happened (Tr. 39).
To assume that plaintiff and Greener can resume marital relations successfully, is to close one's eyes to realities.
Here, in the course of a brief span of married life of less
than two years, the present case is the second time the parties have found themselves in the divorce court. The
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wounds caused the plaintiff by the acts of Greener are too
deep to ever be erased. The marriage in the first place
was not shown to be one of love, but at the sole instance
of Greener and for his convenience. It was based largely,
if not entirely, on trust and reliance upon the word of the
parties. Greener has betrayed that trust, and thus removed any basis for a successful reconciliation. The best
interests of society cannot be subserved by attempting to
force these two people to live together again. Lundgreen
v. Lundgreen,
Utah
, 184 P. 2d 670.
This Court has on several occasions recognized and
repeated the fact that courts usually grant the wife a divorce on the grounds of cruelty on much less evidence than
they do the husband. Doe v. Doe, 48 U. 200, 212, 158 P.
781; Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 U. 580, 245 P. 335; Cordner v.
Cordner, 91 U. 466, 61 P. 2d 601; Lundgreen v. Lundgreen,
supra; Johnson v. Johnson, 107 U. 147, 152 P. 2d 426;
Woolley v. Woolley, 195 P. 2d 743. While we invoke this
doctrine in the present case, we, in no sense of the word,
are to be construed as admitting that plaintiff's case is to
any degree a weak one. On the contrary, we earnestly
submit that the plaintiff's case is a strong one, and that
the record abundantly supports her cause of action and
right to a divorce.
We urge upon the Court that this is a case in which
this Court would be clearly justified and should substitute
its findings in favor of the plaintiff in the place of those
made by the court below in favor of Greener. Steed v.
Steed, 54 U. 244, 181 P. 445; Petty v. Clark, _____l], _ _
192 P. 2d 589; Foreman v. Foreman, _ _u __ 176 P.
2d 144.
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IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS DECREE
IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFF IN THAT THE PLEADINGS DO NOT SUPPORT THE J"UDGMENT.

v
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT
THE TRANSFERS OF THE FUNDS IN THE JOINT ACCOUNTS OF THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER TO JAMES AFTEN
GRJEENER ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER 22, 1947, WERE
FRAUDULENT AS TO THE PLAINTIFF, AND VOID.
VI
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT JAMES AFTEN GREENER HOLDS SAID
FUNDS IN TRUST FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF
THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER DURING HIS NATURAL LIFETIME, AND THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE
ENTITLED TO HAVE SAID FUNDS RELEASED FROM
THE CUSTODY OF THE COURT.
As the assignments immediately above are so interrelated, we shall argue them together.
We have shown in Subsection A of Section I of this
brief as one of the grounds for divorce, that the transfers
of the funds in the joint accounts by Greener to Aften on
or about December 22, 1947, were fraudulent as to the
plaintiff, regardless of whether the plaintiff had a direct
interest in the funds or only such rights as the law accorded
her by reason of her marital status. If this be true, then
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the court below erred in not finding that the transfers were
fraudulent. Likewise, the court erred in finding that Aften
holds the funds in trust for the use and benefit of Greener,
and that the defen<:lants are entitled to the release of the
funds.

We invite the Court's attention to the fact that if the
answer and cross complaint filed in this cause (R, 105-108)
may be construed as an answer by Aften, as well as by
Greener, nevertheless, Aften has prayed for no relief and
Greener seeks relief only as cross complainant. After defendants rested, plaintiff moved the court to dismiss Greener's cross complaint, but the court indicated that he could
not see where anything would be accomplished by it, and
that it might remain just as it is (Tr. 160-161). The court's
finding of fact number 14 ( R, 150) is tantamount to the
dismissal of the cross complaint; consequently there is no
prayer on the part of either defendant for any affirmative
or general relief.
The testimony of Greener, both on the hearings on the
orders to show cause and on the trial, as well as that of
Aften on the order to show cause, was that the funds had
been given to Aften by Greener. Neither of them asked
for any affirmative relief whatsoever as to the funds, or
that a trust be imposed for the benefit of either. As a
mere matter of pleading, therefore, how can the court's decision be sustained? There is no pleading on the part of
either party that will sustain the imposition of a trust in
favor of Greener and, as no such relief was prayed by
either defendant, the pleadings will not support the judgment in this respect. Cain v. Stewart et ux., 47 U. 160;
\Vheelwright v. Roman, 50 U. 10.
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Quite aside from the pleading angle, the court had no
authority to impress a trust upon the funds in favor of
Greener when the transfers were, as we have shown previously herein, fraudulent as to the plaintiff.
In Saint v. Saint (Cal. 1932) 7 P. 374, which was a case
where husband, who was indebted to ·creditors to the extent of $30,000, transferred to his mother and brother his
interest in his father's estate for the purpose of putting the
inheritance beyond reach of creditors, the court, in setting aside the conveyance as fraudulent, said (pp. 376-377):
"No rule of law is more strictly adhered to than
the rule that equity will-not lend its aid to establish
a trust or enforce a contract which is tainted with
fraud. . He who executes a conveyance of property for
the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding his
creditors cannot by an action in equity obtain a reconveyance from his grantee, nor can anyone claiming
under him, except an innocent purchaser. The authorities supporting this well-known rule are legion, and we
need cite only the following: Allstead v. Laumeister,
16 Cal. App. 59, 116 P. 296; Anderson v. Nelson, 83
Cal. App. 1-6, 256 P. 294, 296." (Emphasis supplied)
See also Lyon v. Mazeris, 132 P. 2d 982.
In Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill. 550, 78 N. E. 919, in which
the court set aside certain conveyances made by a husband, for the fraudulent purpose of putting the property
out of his hands to defeat the marital rights of his wife in
case she should sue him for separate maintenance or for
a divorce, the court said:
"
. the evidence shows that those conveyances were made and procured to be made by Chas. H.
Graham, the father of the complainants below, for the
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fraudulent purpose of putting the property out of his
hands to defeat the marital rights of his wife in case
she should sue him for separate maintenance or for a
divorce and alimony, which being true, a court of equity will not set aside those deeds on his application or
that of the complainants, his heirs. We think the evidence clearly shows that the conveyances in question
were executed without consideration.
It does clearly appear that the intention, both,
of the grantor, Charles H. Graham, in making the deed
. to his mother and afterwards consenting that the property should be conveyed to his sister was for the purpose of cheating and defrauding his wife. This being
true, the conveyances became binding upon the grantor, Charles H. Graham, and all parties in privity with
him. Having conveyed the property for the fraudulent purpose of defeating the rights of his wife, the law
will leave him where he placed himself. Both his
mouth and that of his heirs are closed to question the
validity of the conveyances. The law will not permit a
party to deliberately put his property out of his control for a fraudulent purpose, and then, through the
intervention of a court of equity, regain the same after his fraudulent purpose has been accomplished. And
this rule applies not only to him, but to his heirs and
assigns. There is nothing in this record upon which to
base the claim that by the deeds a trust relation was
created between the parties. The purpose, as we have
already said, was to place the title beyond the reach
of the wife of the grantor, and no trust was or could
be thereby created." (Emphasis supplied.)

It seems clear from the foregoing authorities that under the circumstances of this case no trust in favor of
Greener could be impressed upon the funds. This would

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40

seem logically to follow also under the provisions of Sec.
33-1-11, U. C. A., 1943, which provides as follows:
"All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or things
in action made in trust for the use of the person making
the same shall be void as against the existing or subsequent creditors of such person."
If Greener, himself, could not make a transfer of the

funds to Aften in trust for himself, under the statute, how
then could the lower court under the circumstances impose
the trust?
We submit that the judgment below is erroneous in this
respect.
VII
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO PREl\1:ARITAL AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PLAiNTIFF AND DEFENDANT THOMAS
RICHARDSON GREENER, IN FORM AS REQUIRED BY
LAW (33-5-4 SUBSECTION 3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943).

We doubt, except for historical purposes, whether this
finding of the court is pertinent to this case in view of the
divorce settlement and the subsequent agreement between
plaintiff and Greener upon their resumption of marital relations. However, the reason for the failure of the court
to make a finding as to any agreement between the said
parties upon resumption of marital relations may lie in this
finding. We believe the same principles apply.
The court held as a part of this finding "That prior to
the marriage of plaintiff and defendant in defendant's court-
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ship of the plaintiff, he told her of his property, and made
" Just
some offers and promises respecting it . .
what those promises were, the court fails to find, apparently under the view that because the offers and promises were
not in writing they were void under the statute of frauds
enumerated and consequently of no effect in this suit.
The court committed error in two respects in this finding (1) for the reason that the statute of frauds was not
pleaded in the answer of the defendants, and (2) the promises or agreements became executed and thus taken out of
the statute, upon the marriage of the parties in the first instance and in the second instance, when the parties resumed
marital relations subsequent to the time the divorce was set
aside.
The rule as to the necessity for pleading the statute of
frauds is tersely stated and settled in this state in the early
opinion of this Court in Abba v. Smyth, 21 U, 109, as follows (pp. 118-120):
"Upon an examination of the answer it will appear
that no issue under the statute of frauds was raised
therein. The statute of frauds was not plead, nor was
any defense such as was interposed at the trial set out.
So far as appears, the plaintiff had no notice of the defense that was interposed until the trial had commenced. • * *
The plea of the statute of frauds is a personal privilege which a party may waive, and by failing to specifically plead it as a defense, defendant could not afterward avail himself of its benefits. This is the general
and approved rule. Wilson v. Sullivan, 17 Utah 341;
Lauer v. Richmond, Co-op. Inst., 8 Utah, 305; Wood on
the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 538; 9 Enc. of Pl. & Pr., pp.
705, 713, and cases cited; Gill v. Clement, 59 Mo. App.
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484; Muldoon, et al., v. Brown, et at., 59 Pac. 720; 21
Utah 121.
"If the defendant admits the contract, he must
still interpose the defense of the statute of frauds in
his answer, in order to make it available in his defense.
Maybee v. Moore, 90 Mo., 343; 9 Enc. of Pl. & Pr., p.
713, and cases cited; Iverson v. Cirkel, 56 Minn., 299;
Connor v. lfingtgen, 19 Neb., 472; Ashmore v. Evans,
11 N. J. E., 151; Duffy v. O'Donovan, 46 N. Y., 223;
Barrett v. ~lcAllister, 33 West Va., 738,"

Cf. Utah Mercur Gold Min. co. v. Herschel Gold Min.
Co., 103 U. 249, 134 P. 2d 1094 and Cardon v. Ha.rper, 106
U. 560, 151 P. 2d 99.
The statute of frauds has no application to oral contracts that have been fully executed. Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 U. 161, 128 P. 2d 282; Frick v. Rockwell City Canning Co., 192 Iowa 11, 181 N. W. 475; Besse v. McHenry, 89
Mont. 520, 300 P. 199; Tabola v. Wholey (Cal.) 170 P. 2d.
952, 956.
It is difficult to understand how the court below fell
into error in this finding, particularly when the plea of the
statute was not set forth in the answer because that same
issue was before the court but a short time previously in
Harris v. Wilstead, now on appeal to this Court. In the
court's opinion in that case (R, 15) the court held that the
statute of frauds was not available as a defense because it
was not pleaded.
VIII
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT
PLAINTIFF AND GREENER ENTERED INTO AN
.ORA.L AGREEMENT IN CONSIDERATION OF THE
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SETTING ASIDE OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE,
WHICH AGREEMENT WAS FURTHER CONSUMMATED BY THE SIGNING OF CERTAIN WRITTEN
AGREEMENTS, WHEREBY THE PLAINTIFF BECAME
THE OWNER AS JOINT TENANT WITH GREENER ON
AND AFTER ABOUT APRIL 16, 1947, OF FUNDS
THJERETOFORE ON DEPOSIT WITH CERTAIN DEPOSITORIES TO THE SOLE AND SEPARATE ACCOUNT OF GREENER
IX
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER IS THE SOLE ,
OWNER OF THE FUNDS NOW IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE COURT.

Mrs. Rowland, the sister-in-law of plaintiff, testified·
that when Greener first came to her and inquired of her
whether she thought the plaintiff would marry him, he
held out to her that he was an individual of substantial
means, even to the extent that some people thoughthe was
worth forty thousand dollars. Hle denied he had that much,
but he assured her that he had enough to keep the plaintiff the rest of her days and she would never have. to go
on old age pension. He returned the following morning
and said to her, "Mrs. Rowland, you can make that as big
as you want, and I will make it good." ('fr. 5-6).
Mrs. Rowland conveyed the information to the plaintiff, who told her to tell Greener to do his own courting.
That very night Greener called on plaintiff-object, matrimony. That same evening he told her that if she would
have him he had plenty of money to keep her on and that
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she could have the money. He also told her that he had
thirty thousand dollars in money, two thousand dollars in
bonds, five hundred dollars his son owed him and another
five hundred dollars two grandsons owed him. He told her
she "could have all that and everything he had, and the old
man thrown in with it, if she would have him" (Tr. 13).
After that conversation Greener visited her every day,
and in the conversations that ensued he made the same
promises over and over again (Tr. 14). Plaintiff told Greener she would have to wait and see whether she wanted to
get married or not. In about two weeks she made up her
mind and told him that she would marry him. He reiterated his promises and told plaintiff they would go to Salt
Lake City and Provo and have her name put on the bank
books "so that she would be just as much owner of the money as he was."
After their marriage they visited the various depositories and entered into the several agreements that have
been received in evidence as Exhibits A, B, C, D, and I.
Subsequently, upon the granting of the divorce and
property settlement, the parties again went to the depositories and had the plaintiff's name removed from the agreements and accounts.
In about a week's time Greener was back importuning
the plaintiff to return to him and making the promises over
and over again, that if she would return to him she could
have all the money, everything he had and the old man
thrown in. He appealed to members of her family to put
in a good word for him, and at least on one occasion in the
presence of plaintiff's daughter-in-law, Leora Ostler, re·
iterated the promise that if plaintiff would return to him
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"he would give her all his property and all his money and
the old man throwed in" (Tr. 63).
On the strength of these promises, plaintiff agreed· to
return to Greener, joined with him in a motion to set aside
the decree, and thereafter went with him to the various depositories and entered into the several agreements of which
Exhibits E, F, G, H, and I are true copies.
The plaintiff "would not have gone back to Mr. Greener at that time if he had not made these promises with respect to this money ._~~~t was on deposit in the bank, and
his propertyH· ( Tr. 23) .
Greener has o..:- cours~ denied making such promises,
but we submit thm: in view of the impeachment of his
testimony in other respects, as hereinbefore shown, the
fact that Leora Ostler corroborated the testimony of the
plaintiff in this regard, and for other reasons, the denial
of Greener is unworthy of belief. We point out here the
making of promises as broad as those above when he testified (and the court found, R, 150) that at the time she·
left him last time he told her he "would give her· everything she wanted if she would stay" (Tr. 146, 149).
"Everything she wanted" might well include "all his
property, and all his money, and the old man throwed in."
As a consequence of the promises made by Greener to
the plaintiff, her acceptance of them, the setting aside of
the decree of divorce, and her return to the marital status,
what are plaintiff's rights in and to the· property involved?
In the light of the specific promises· made by Greener,
and the acceptance of the promises' by the plaintiff and .her
return to him after the divorce,· on the strength of those
promises, we b~lieve the record would justify the conclusion that plaintiff owns the entire funds involved in this
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suit. However, there seem to be instances in the testimony
of the plaintiff, as well as Greener, which would indicate
that nothing more than a present joint interest in the funds,
with the light of survivorship, was contemplated py the
parties. We .believe. the record shows conclusively at least
that.
Plaintiff, therefore, claims to be entitled to one-half
of the funds that were in the depositories to the credit ·of
Greener and her, as joint tenants, on and before December
22, 1947, to-wit, one-half of $19,879.27, or $9,939.63. She
also claims that the remainder of said funds are charged
with a trust ·for her benefit for two purposes: (1) for her
support and maintenance during her lifetime and costs of
this suit, and (2) because of her right of survivorship in
said funds.
The decisions are legion in the various jurisdictions
dealing with the rights of parties to funds on deposit in
joint accounts. Without laboring this brief with the citations of such cases, we state that in circumstances such as
are reflected in the instant cause, where parties have entered into an agreement with depositories that the funds
shall be held in joint tenancy, some courts hold that the
'agreement is conclusive as to the intention of the parties,
and that the courts are bound by the agreement, regardless
of whether the controversy arises during the lives of the
parties to the agreement or after the death of one of them.
Tobola v. Wholey, supra. Other courts hold that after the
death of one of the parties to the joint tenancy, the agreement is conclusive as to the intention of the parties, but
during the joint lives of the parties only a presumption of
joint- tenancy exists. The decisions of this Court fall in the
latter category, as reflected by Holt v. Bayles, 85 U. 364,
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39 P. 2d. 715, and Neill v. Royce, 101 U. 181, 120 P. 2d. 327,
where the cases are cited at length and the whole question
is reviewed exhaustively.
These two cases were cited and relied upon by the lower court as the basis for its decision that Greener was the
sole owner of the funds in controversy (R, 117-118). We
believe the court misinterpreted the Neill case and, furthermore, failed to take into account certain testimony of the
parties which would, beyond question, require a contrary
result.
If, as the court below did, we disregard entirely the
testimony of the plaintiff and her daughter-in-law, and consider only the testimony of Greener, and that only in one
respect (that the only reason for having plaintiff made a
party to the joint tenancy agreements was to avoid probate), then we have a case at least as strong as, if not
stronger than, that presented in the Neill case by that
plaintiff. In that case the plaintiff seemed to rely solely
upon the joint tenancy agreement as establishing the joint
ownership of the defendant in the funds out of which plain. tiff was seeking to recover support money for her and defendant's children. Both the defendant and the intervenor
(his second wife )testified that the funds belonged to the
intervenor, and that the only reason that the funds were
deposited in the joint savings account, rather than in an
account in intervenor's name alone, was that in case of her
death the money would be immediately available for the
education of her children by a former marriage, without
the cost and trouble of probate. This is essentially the gist
of Greener's testimony as to the purpose of placing the
plaintiff's name on the joint accounts, for he testified the
only reason was, "Should I drop off at any time, and someSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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body's name wasn't on there, it would have to go into the
probate court and be used up in the probate court, lawyers
and the court, so that I told her that I put her name on for
the purpose" (Tr. 122). Other testimony in the Neill case
by the parties to the joint savings account was to the effect" that the money was intended to be the sole and separate property of the intervenor." Yet, in the face of such
testimony on the part of both parties to the agreement,
which is. certainly stronger than the evidence of Greener
in this case, this Court held that, "Such proof under the
circumstances of this case cannot be termed so clear and
convincing as to require the trial court to find in favor of
appellant."
In the instant case, the lower court argues in its opinion that, because the plaintiff accepted $2,000 in settlement
of property rights at the time of the divorce, and never
dr~w against any of the funds to provide her with necessaries and to repay Greener the $2,000, of which he accused
her of robbing him, and over which there was constant
quarreling, she has failed to make out her case.
The court asks several questions, attempts to answer
them, and then concludes from the pleadings and testimony
of the plaintiff herself "that she had no such understanding
[that she had a present interest in the funds], and where
the true purpose is testified to by the defendant with no
impeachment* that the intention of the parties was that
her rights should arise at his death, it appears that the

*We shall show later that, in addition to the testimony
of at least one other witness, Greener has himself impeached his own testimony in this regard.
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standard of clarity and certainty has been met and the pre...
sumption of the agreements between the parties and the
depositories overcome.''
If this Court had followed any such rule as this, then
we submit that it could not have arrived at the result that
it did in the Neill case. As we read the opinion in that case
there was no impeachment of the testimony of either the
defendant or int8rvenor. Both of them testified (as only
one party to the agreements did in the instant case) that
their intention was only to take advantage of the survivorship provision, and that the money was intended to be the
sole and separate property of the intervenor; yet this Court
held that the provisions of the joint tenancy agreement
should prevail over such testimony. In the instant case,
to say the least, there is a conflict between the testimony
of the parties to the agreement, which is all the more
reason why the plaintiff should prevail in view of Greener's
burden to overcome the presumption established by the
agreements, "by clear and convincing proof to the contrary."
The court below asks whether if plaintiff "had acquired
a present joint title with defendant in all of these funds,
would she have endured his alleged stinginess? Would she
have asked him for every penny? Would she have bought
only one pair of stockings and one underslip during _their
whole marriage?" To the court, the answer seemed obvious that if plaintiff had known that the accounts were hers
as much as Greener's, she would have bought what she
wanted.
It is odd that the court should premise its question
and make its answer on the basis of facts which the court
later in its opinion finds never existed. If the facts did not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50

exist, then obviously there never was need for the plaintiff to draw against the funds, even under the court's reasoning. What the court does, therefore, is to presume the
existence of the facts and then presume the result-presumption based upon presumption. Presumption. may not
be pyramided on presumption, nor inference on inference.
Neel v. Henne (Wash.) 190 P. 2d 775; 22 C. J. pp. 84-85;
Manning v. John Hancock, etc., 100 U. S. 693; United S1a.tes
v. Ross, 92 U. S. 28.
Continuing, the court asks the question "assuming that
[quarreling and bickering over the $2,000 settlement] to be
true, would she have endured it knowing that she had the
present right to draw the $2,000 from one of the depositories and give it to him"? We are reluctant to ever so
characterize a question or statement of any court, but in
our opinion this question is ridiculous, and indicates very
little understanding on the part of the court of the immediate problem involved. If the quarreling and bickering
over the money existed (which of course we believe has
been established beyond doubt), how in the world could this
plaintiff expect to bring about peace and tranquility by
withdrawing two thousand dollars out of the joint account
and giving it to Greener so that he could put it back into
the joint account, or even in a separate account, for that
matter? The answer in this instance is obvious.
The court then asks whether the plaintiff would have
accepted $2,000 in full settlement of all property rights
upon the divorce if she were entitled to joint ownership with
Greener in the funds that approached $30,000. The ans-wers to this question may be thousand-fold. The record
does not give the answer. Plaintiff was not questioned in
this regard. We do not think it is necessarily material, and
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disagree with the court's reasoning that the situation now
existing is necessarily and essentially the same as when the
settlement was made. But if it is, the answers may still
be legion. It might be suggested that plaintiff was not
properly represented at that time, and that counsel who
represented her in name were actually and in fact more
interested in looking out for Greener, whose counsel they
are in the instant suit. It might be suggested that plaintiff
"leaned over backwards" to please Greener-she was doing
that by getting the divorce. Perhaps she felt that she had
been married to him such a short time that, even though
she may have had a legal claim to more, she would not insist on her full rights. Whatever the real answer might be,
certainly it is not necessarily the answer given by the court.
The foregoing questions posed by the court fall into
one category, viz., whether the failure of the plaintiff to
draw on the accounts is a persuasive fact in determining
the ownership of a joint tenancy. Apparently this Court
did not think so in the Neill case, because there, although
the defendant came up with $500 obtained from the joint
savings accotmt, it is not shown that it was withdrawn by
him, or that he ever made any withdrawals from the ac~
count. Cf. Beach v. Holland (Ore.) 142 P. 2d. 990.
X

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SOLE PUR)POSE AND INTENTION OF THE PLAINTIFF AND GREENER IN PLACING THE PLAINTIFF'S
NAME ON THE VARIOUS AGREEMENTS AND BANK
BOOKS OF TH\E DEPOSITORIES WAS TO A VOID PROBATE, AND NEITHER OF THEM AT ANY TIME, CON-
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SIDERED THAT THE PLAINTIFF OWNED ANY PRESENT INTEREST IN SAID FUNDS.
We challenge the above finding, as well as the statement in the court's opinion to the effect that the true purpose, as testified to by Greener, with no impeachment, was
that the intention of the parties was that plaintiff's rights
should arise at Greener's death.
Plaintiff testified that Greener told her one day that
she was crazy that she didn't write out some checks and
get some of the money (Tr. 35).
Greener testified on cross examination as follows (Tr.
146):
· "Q. Now you knew at the time you and Mrs. Greener
were on these accounts in these institutions in Salt Lake
that both of you could draw on those accounts, that was
your understanding?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there was no limitation upon either one of
you going into the banks and drawing?

A.

No sir; got to have the books to do it.

Q. You never imposed any limitations on it whatever, did you?
A. No, I didn't object to it at all."

And on direct examination (Tr. 158-159):
"Q. Did you ever have any intention at any time that
lVIrs. Greener, the present plaintiff, should ever ~ave any of
that money as her own during your .lifetime?

A.
ment.

Yes, provided she fulfilled her part of the agree-
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Now what do you mean by that?
A. When she come back to me I asked her what she
was going to do. And she said she was going to prove to
me she was a real wife this time and fulfill all her promises and make me happy. And that's what she had to do to
get it.
Q. And is that all?
A. Well, a good many other promises she made before I took her back."
Q.

And again, on cross examination:
"Q. So that on those promises you took her back and
you went to Salt Lake and signed these contracts and she
became part owner of the funds with you, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And it was such that you intended at that time?
A. Yes."
On the hearing on the first order to show cause, Greener testified as follows (Tr. 201-202):
"Q. Now, prior to the time of your divorce Mrs.
Greener was a joint owner of the bank accounts with you,
wasn't she?
A. She is what?
Q. She was on the bank accounts, you each had the
right to draw checks against the account?
A. There was Thomas R. Greener, or Amy E. Greener.
Q. Yes. And that is your wife.
A. Yes.
Q. That was before the divorce, wasn't it?
A. That is the way it stood all the time.

""

* •

•
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Q. Mrs. Greener had access to the bank books all the
time before the time you drew out the money, didn't she?
A. Yes.
Q. Same as you had?
A. Yes."

The foregoing testimony from the mouth of Greener,
we submit, is eloquent denial of his other statement (which
the court took to the exclusion of all others) to the effect
that the intention of the parties was that plaintiff's right
should arise at his death.
What stronger statement does a court require to prove
present interest than the above; particularly Greener's
statement that when the parties signed the contracts Mrs.
Greener became part o\vner of the funds with him and ht:
intended such at the time?
In the light of this testimony, we submit that Greener
cannot. possibly meet the burden of proof required by this
Court in the Neill case, but, on the other hand, plaintiff,
with the very able assistance of Greener, has proved a
present ownership in the funds beyond any peradventure
of doubt. The extent of that ownership is established by
the joint tenancy agreements, admitted in evidence, as onehalf of the whole. Cf. State Board of Equalization v. Cole
(1\tlont.) 195 P. 2d 989, 994.
We submit, therefore, that the court ererd in making
the finding set forth in the heading of this section of this
brief, and in failing to find that the plaintiff owns and has
a present interest in the funds, now in the hands of the
Clerk of the Court, by reason of the several agreements
entered into between the plaintiff and Greener and between
plaintiff, Greener and the various depositories.
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We submit also that the court erred in failing to award
to plaintiff as her sole property one-half of the funds that
were on deposit on December 22, 1947. Cf. Nusshold v.
Kruschke (Ore.) 159 P. 2d 819.
XI

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPRESS A
TRUST ON THAT PORTION OF THE FUNDS REMAINING AFTER DEDUCTION OF PLAINTIFF'S ONE-HALF
INTEREST, FOR HER SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE
AS WELL AS FOR HER RIGHT OF SURWVORSHIP.
We have shown in Section I, subsection A, of this brief
that the transfer of the funds by Greener to Aften Wa.!l
fraudulent, not only as to plaintiff's one-half interest, but
to the balance of the fund, as well. We have also shown
that under such circumstances the plaintiff has demands
enforceable in equity against that balance for her support
and maintenance and also to the extent of her right to
share in the funds upon the decease of Greener, and that
these demands are a specific charge upon the funds involved.. We have also shown that Greener is entitled to no
relief under the pleadings, or under the well defined rules
of equity. We have also shown that a court of equity will
not lend its aid to establish ? trust in favor of Greener under the circumstances of this case, and that the lower court
erred in this respect.
We believe, therefore, that under the pleadings and the
law, plaintiff is the only person who now has a legitimate
claim to any part of the funds. We submit that, in addition to her right to recover her one-half of the fund, as
shown in the next preceding section, a trust in her favor
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should be impressed upon the balance of the funds for her
support and maintenance, her costs in connection with this
suit, as well as for her right of survivorship in case Greener
predeceases her.
XII
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A'ITORNEYS' FEES OR
COSTS AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BEAR
HER OWN EXPENSES.
We submit that the court erred in denying plaintiff
counsel fees and costs.
The record shows that plaintiff has no means by which
she can pay her attorneys' fees. We submit the record itself as to the vast amount of work performed by counsel,
first, in locating the funds involved; second, in bringing
them under the jurisdiction of the court, and, finally, in the
trial of the case on its merits. We urge on this Court that
the sum of $350.00 would be a very modest fee for counsels' services up to and including the entry of judgment below.
Upon the stipulation of counsel for the parties that the
sum of $1,000.00 is a reasonable sum for the servi~es ~f
plaintiff's counsel on appeal, pursuant to plaintiff's motion
for such allowance, the court below allowed only the sum
of $600.00, payable in certain installments (R, 165-166).
We submit that plaintiff should be awarded the additional
sum of $400.00 as and for attorneys' fees on this appeal.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we submit to the Court that the record
is devoid of any specific instances of misconduct upon the
part of the plaintiff. She comes into court with "clean
hands," to protect her property rights and to be freed from
the husband who has attempted to defraud her, and whose
conduct toward her makes it impossible for the marital
status to continue. She is entitled to the aid of a court of
equity.
On the other hand, the "clean hands" rule, which is
"the most important rule affecting the administration of
justice" (Katz v. Karlsson, (Cal.) 191 P. 2d 541), denies
either defendant any relief in this cause.
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff is entitled to
a divorce from Greener upon the grounds alleged and
proved herein and to attorneys' fees in connection therewith; that in connection with the divorce she is entitled to
a reasonable provision for her support and maintenance
out of the balance of funds now in court custody after the
allotment to her of her one-half interest therein; that irrespective of whether she is granted a divorce, she is entitled
to one-half of the fund, and to support, maintenance, counsel fees, and to her right of survivorship out of the balance
of said funds, and that a trust for such purposes should be
impressed upon the balance of such funds.

Respectfully submitted,
SANDGREN AND BLACKHAM,
S. E. BLACKHAM,
CLYDE D. SANDGREN,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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